


**Comment Letter O083****O083****Winslow Properties**P.O. Box 2562  
Visalia, CA 93279RENTALS  
APARTMENTS • HOMES • COMMERCIAL  
SINCE 1944**SERGE WINSLOW**  
(209) 734-3746**CARY S. WINSLOW**  
(209) 733-8379California High-Speed Rail Authority  
925 L Street Suite 1425  
Sacramento, CA 95814

August 27, 2004

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

Re : High Speed Rail-San Joaquin Valley and State at large

Please register me as in favor of any plan or program that would promote, build, facilitate or in any other manner cause to become a reality an alternate means to the automobile of transportation in California.

O083-1

I would favor a HIGH SPEED RAIL LINE to be built that would follow the Union Pacific rail line with a stop in Visalia, California.

O083-2

The San Joaquin Valley has the worst air quality in the state. With out some alternate means to the automobile or heavy truck the bad air will make the San Joaquin Valley uninhabitable in 10 years. Bad air is bad for business. We cannot continue to build freeways and add automobiles to the roads no matter what Cal Trans or the Highway Trust Fund Advocates propose.

A moratorium should be placed on any new highway construction until the mass transit system is planned and built with high-speed rail as a cornerstone of the plan. Highway gas tax funds should be diverted from highway construction to the mass transit construction. No new subdivisions for home should be allowed to be developed unless a mass transit link is provided to the new areas. Railroads should not be allowed to abandon or sell any existing railroad right of ways for profit that could be used for transit in the future.

O083-3

We cannot continue to poison our air and water with automobile based pollution and have no alternate plan of action. Air pollution and traffic congestion are bad for business and something must be done now to reverse this trend and solve this monumental problem for the people of the State of California.

Very truly yours,

Cary S. Winslow  
Winslow Properties

CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED RAIL AUTHORITY

U.S. Department  
of Transportation  
**Federal Railroad  
Administration**

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**Response to Comments of Cary S. Winslow, Winslow Properties, September 7, 2004 (Letter O083)**

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**O083-01**

Acknowledged.

**O083-02**


Please see standard response 6.21.1.

**O083-03**

Comment acknowledged. These suggested actions go beyond the scope of the program EIR/EIS process, and are not within the powers and authorities of the co-lead agencies to undertake.

**Comment Letter 0084****0084**

Yolo Rail Advocates  
201 K St.  
Davis, CA 95616  
530-750-1133

**Comments on HSR DEIR**

The DEIR is deficient in that it eliminates the Altamont Pass, original preferred alternative from the valley to the Bay Area, from study.

The elimination is based on the difficulty in splitting trains and the cost of a Dumbarton crossing. These claims are supported only by a loose, poorly explained footnote on page 2-36 and a few pages in Appendix 2-J.

The claims are easily contested. In fact, in April 2004 the CHSRA paid the Japan Railway Technical Service \$10,000 to evaluate the feasibility of the Altamont Route, and the JRST touted its own train splitting technology used on the Shinkansen, which allows trains to split at Fremont and portions of the train routed to San Jose, San Francisco, and/or Oakland with delays of no more than three minutes (see Attachment 1).

The best route for HSR, in terms of construction costs, ridership revenue, passenger patronage, environmental impacts, and sprawl prevention is likely over Altamont Pass. Until this route is studied and compared with the Pacheco and Diablo routes, the DEIR is of no worth to the CHSR in determining the routing from the Central Valley to the Bay Area.

In the interests of the people of California, the Yolo Rail Advocates request that the DEIR be revised with an Altamont Pass study before further decisions are made. Specifically, we request that a study be conducted with

1. Phase 1 project, San Francisco to Los Angeles via Altamont Pass, with a spur to San Jose.
2. Phase 1 project, San Francisco to Los Angeles via Altamont Pass, no spurs.

Thank you,

Ted Buehler  
Yolo Rail Advocates

**1. Advantages of the Altamont Route**

Altamont Pass has many advantages over the Diablo or Pacheco routes:

\* The HSR system at full buildout is 50 miles shorter, resulting in substantially lower costs for track maintenance.

\* Sacramento and the Northern San Joaquin Valley will be better served by an Altamont routing, both in phase 1 and full buildout. The routes included in study will not serve Sacramento-Bay Area travelers in their current configuration, but could serve them well with little delay to LA-Bay Area travelers.

\* Over 1 million people live along the Altamont Pass route from Fremont to Merced—why not build HSR and serve these people?

\* These 1 million people could play a key role in winning a bond referendum. If HSR can be built over Altamont at the same or lesser cost than Pacheco/Diablo, why not build it there and gain the support of these voters?

\* There is an enormous public benefit to creating an express rail corridor from Stockton to the Bay Area. Billions will be spent on this corridor in the next 20 years in any event, so even if the Altamont corridor does cost more than the Pacheco or Diablo routes, it may still be the most economical choice for the state.

With all these advantages, it is curious that the Altamont route was not studied.

Fortunately, the primary "weaknesses" used to dismiss the Altamont route from further study are rather flimsy, so the benefits of an Altamont routing may still be available to the people of the State of California, it will simply have to be studied side-by-side with the Pacheco and Diablo routes.

We urge that the CHSRA begin this study as soon as possible, while the contractors still have the software and staff that performed the original study. Any unnecessary delay in commissioning a study will increase the cost of the study and will be a disservice to the people of California.

The primary "weaknesses" of the Altamont Pass Routing as described on pages 2-35—2-38. They appear to hinge on

- 1) the operational issues involved in splitting trains in Fremont and
- 2) the costs and environmental impacts of building an additional Dumbarton Bridge.

0084-1

0084-1  
cont

## Comment Letter 0084 Continued

### 2. Problems with DEIR pages 2-35—2-39—Problems of splitting and combining trains

The claims on pages 2-35—2-39, that dismiss the Altamont Pass Routing are largely unsupported and inaccurate. Given the facts stated below, the arguments against an Altamont Pass routing are null and void, and the DEIR should be revised to include study of:

1. Phase 1 project, San Francisco to LA via Altamont Pass, with a spur to San Jose.
2. Phase 1 project, San Francisco to LA via Altamont Pass, no spurs.

#### 1. Splitting trains—Late 20th Century technology allows for quick separation of transportation equipment

The DEIR claims that trains cannot be split and routed to different final destinations from an intermediate station en route. This claim is stated on footnote 10, p. 2-36.

*Separate trains are required as trainsets cannot easily be split to send some vehicles to each destination. While some passenger train services currently operate in this manner, the time required to physically separate each trainset into smaller units and prepare them for individual operation would be prohibitive, and the process would be highly undesirable for the passengers involved in the operation. Thus, it is to be assumed that the high-speed trainsets would not be physically separated during the operational period.* (DEIR, p. 2-36)

Footnote 10 is not supported by any references or discussion.

Footnote 10 is, however, directly contradicted by information provided to the CHSRA by the Japan Railway Technical Service (JRTS), which states that train splitting is perfectly feasible and adds only 2-3 minutes delay to trips (See the entire JRTS document in Attachment 1).

In particular, the JRTS reports that

*Regarding this problem [service to Oakland and San Jose spurs], improvement can be made to a considerable extent by adopting the EMU system like the Shinkansen. Specifically, from the experience in Japan, it is considered highly feasible to ensure the necessary number of trains by implementing the split and combine of trainsets at the Newark/Fremont station (or one station before). The time length required for the train split and combine work is only 2 to 3 minutes.* (JRTS, p. 2)

Thus, the "problem" of splitting trains, as outlined in Footnote 20, has already been solved by the Shinkansen. Technologically and operationally, it is a non-issue. Schedulewise, it will add 2-3 minutes of time.

This knowledge was provided to the CHSRA in a commissioned study, but was overlooked or deliberately omitted in the DEIR.

#### 2. Splitting trains results in more efficient utilization of equipment

Splitting trains in Newark would offer a more efficient utilization of passenger equipment. Instead of having trains running 1/3 empty from San Jose to Oakland or SF, trainsets could be separated to reduce the deadheading of empty seats. This would result in an overall reduction of equipment needs, as San Jose equipment could be returned to service immediately after stopping in San Jose, rather than deadheading (as a partially empty train) to San Francisco and back.

This should be included in any operations and capital equipment requirement considerations.

#### 3. Even without splitting trains, the "cross-platform transfer" concept allows for high quality service

In the 1970s BART utilized a system of cross-platform transfers at MacArthur Station to enable passengers to transfer between the SF-Concord line and the Fremont-Richmond line. By having both trains stop at the station simultaneously, the stress and delays associated with transfers were nearly eliminated.

The calculations used in Table 2-6.4 should be reconsidered using this approach to estimate ridership—assume that if, for instance, a SF-bound train stops at Newark, that passengers to San Jose or Oakland would be able to transfer across the platform to a to Oakland or San Jose train. This would reduce the loss of ridership due all trains not stopping in SJ, SF, and Oakland.

#### 4. Altamont vs Pacheco ridership details needed

Given that the Altamont routing includes a catchment area of one million people more than the Pacheco/Diablo routing, the DEIR should include details on how the Pacheco routing gains enough additional ridership from a smaller population base to be considered comparable to Altamont's.

#### 5. Altamont commute data required

Given the growing commute demand over Altamont Pass as San Jose employees spill into the valley, the overall utility of an Altamont Pass routing could be significantly greater than would be determined by restricting analysis to intercity travel. Improved transit (such as HSR) on the Altamont Pass corridor will contribute greatly to facilitating travel without increasing highway congestion. Funding that will be used to improve rail service over Altamont Pass under present conditions can be used to help construct HSR if the HSR system can be used to resolve existing regional transportation problems.

O084-1  
cont

O084-1  
cont

**Comment Letter 0084 Continued****3. Comments on Appendix 2-J—Dumbarton crossing feasibility**

The assumptions for a new Dumbarton Bridge (as outlined in Appendix 2-J) are erroneous and should be corrected.

Accurate assessment of the cost of a Dumbarton Bridge is critical to evaluating the viability of the Altamont route. The Diablo and Pacheco routes include many more total route miles and tunnel miles, and if the cost of crossing the bay is overestimated, a potential savings of billions of dollars to the people of California will be forfeited.

1. Comparison of Dumbarton to Mid-Bay Crossing

Appendix 2-J estimates the cost of a Dumbarton Bridge to be comparable to the cost-estimates of a new mid-bay rail bridge. The Dumbarton Corridor, however, has significant differences that make the calculations in Appendix 2-J inaccurate.

- a) The Mid-Bay span is built over deep water, requiring more complicated staging of construction equipment, while the Dumbarton Bridge is built over marshland.
- b) The Mid-Bay span is built in open water, with no nearby structures used for staging. The Dumbarton Bridge can use two existing bridges for staging.

2. Lack of consideration of the new San Mateo road bridge span for cost comparison

In 2002, a 2-lane bridge was added to the existing San Mateo Bridge for a cost of \$190M (<http://bridgepros.com/projects/SanMateo-Hayward/sanmateo.htm>). This is a longer structure than the Dumbarton Bridge, with a higher, longer main span, in deeper water. The evidence that a new span can be built across the bay, adjacent to an existing span, indicates that it may be possible to build a second Dumbarton span adjacent to the existing highway or rail bridge for a comparable or lower cost.

3. Environmental impacts of new bridge not evaluated

Environmental impacts of a new bridge may be significant, but the DEIR does not provide any documentation to support the following claims:

- \* A new runway at SFO would require \$1B in environmental mitigation
- \* The environmental mitigation required by a new Dumbarton bridge is comparable to mitigation for an airport runway

Unverified claims should not be used when eliminating a corridor from consideration.

4. "High Speed Factor--Design Speed of Bridge

Discussion of the Altamont Pass option should include considerations of a lower design speed on the Dumbarton Bridge. Appendix 2-J indicates that the cost estimates for a 125 mph bridge are estimated to be 20% higher than an 80 mph bridge, resulting in a \$100M increase in construction costs.

As p. 2-37 indicates that the Altamont Pass route (with a 125 mph bridge) would provide a 3-minute improvement in the SF-LA travel time as compared to the Pacheco Pass route. Since the time difference for 6 miles at 80 mph vs. 125 mph is less than three minutes, a Dumbarton Bridge could be built for 80 mph trains and still provide the same quality of service for SF-LA passengers as a Pacheco Pass routing.

**4. Other comments**1. Budget for system expansion

The notion that revenue from phase 1 of the project will be used to pay for system extensions is unrealistic. HSR anticipates charging SF-LA passengers about \$20 for the trip, comparable to the Sacramento-San Jose fare on the Capitol Corridor. The Capitol Corridor receives annual subsidies from the state. Even if the per-passenger cost from SF to LA on HSR was the same as Sac-SJ on the Capitol Corridor, the operation will require subsidies. To use rider revenue to fund future expansion, the per-passenger cost of a SF-LA passenger would have to be considerably lower than that of a Sac-SJ passenger on the Capitol Corridor.

If this budget does indeed turn out to be unrealistic, it is critically important that phase 1 to the project be built so that it serves well as a stand-alone project, meaning it should link the most population centers possible.

2. West Side Line in San Joaquin Valley

We request that the West Side Line be studied in the San Joaquin Valley. This was the line originally proposed in 1999, and we have reason to believe it will be much less costly to construct and have fewer negative impacts on the surrounding areas. Building a HSR line alongside and existing freight right-of-way, through towns, across utility corridors, is likely to encounter unforeseen problems and result in cost-overruns.

O084-1  
cont

O084-2

O084-3

## Comment Letter 0084 Continued

Attachment 1—Japan Railway Technical Service comments on Altamont Pass

**QUICK REVIEW COMMENTS  
FOR  
DRAFT REPORT  
ON  
CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED TRAIN  
PROGRAM EIR/EIS**

April 2004

Japan Railway Technical Service

7

*Quick Review on Altamont Pass route option*

**1. Foreword**

In September 2000 "The Review of the Final Report on California High-Speed Rail Corridor Evaluation (Phase I)" was submitted to the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) by Japan Railway Technical Service (JARTS).

The report by JARTS includes recommendations which reflect the operational experience and the latest modernized technologies of the Shinkansen, which has entered on the 40<sup>th</sup> year of operation. The comment in the report covers station locations and route selection; superiority of the EMU system; design standard; train operation planning; commuter transport; and freight transport.

At the additional request of CHSRA, JARTS submitted its comment on the technical feasibility of minimum sharp curve radius in December 2000. Thereafter, at the CHSRA's Board Meeting in September 2002 and January 2003, we made presentations on the Japanese Shinkansen.

In the Draft Program EIR/EIS Report published on January 27, 2004, it is proposed that the Altamont Pass route option should be eliminated from the options to be studied for the connection between the Bay Area and the Central Valley. This time, CHSRA has requested us to provide our comment on this issue.

JARTS would like to express our profound esteem for the efforts of CHSRA in drawing up the massive Draft Program EIR/EIS Report as a result of long years of discussions including the debate in public hearings and also based on the extensive technical study.

**2. Comment on the screening for further advancement**

For its further advancement, the CHSR Project is now in the stage which requires further consideration including possible modifications to alignments to be studied. Since the publication of the Screening Evaluation Report (October 2001), studies and discussions have continuously been made regarding the elimination of some routes and stations from the objects of analysis for the project. In taking another step forward in the planning stage, it has become necessary to focus on the objects of study in the advanced stage so as to restrain the increase in study costs.

In the Draft Program EIR/EIS Report the screening on the Altamont Pass route option has been conducted fairly and reasonably in accordance with the evaluation objectives and criteria on the specified routes and stations.

**3. Consideration of the comparative merit of Altamont Pass route option**

The Altamont Pass route option has the merit of travel time reduction between the San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento. Between Sacramento and San Jose, while the travel time via the Pacheco Pass route is 72 minutes, the one via the Altamont Pass route is 47 minutes, showing the reduction of 25 minutes. As for the Sacramento-San Francisco section, while the time required via the Pacheco Pass route is 100 minutes, the one via the Altamont Pass route is 59 minutes (87 minutes if the bridge across the San Francisco Bay is not constructed), causing the reduction of 41 minutes (13 minutes if the bridge is not constructed).

The main objective of the CHSR Project is the high-speed linkage between major metropolitan areas of the state with competitive travel times and frequent service, such as the long-distance link between Los Angeles and San Francisco and between Los Angeles and Sacramento. It is reasonable that the Draft Program EIR/EIS Report has regarded the conventional railway service improvement from Sacramento to San Francisco as the matter to be promoted separately from the CHSR Project (page 2-34, 35). JARTS is in favor of this idea.

In the past, the Pacheco Pass route was estimated to require the construction cost larger than that of the Altamont Pass route by 2,000 million dollars because of its larger construction length. However, according to recent investigations, it is considered that there is no large difference between the two route options in

Japan Railway Technical Service

1

8



## Comment Letter 0084 Continued

*Quick Review on Altamont Pass route option*

terms of construction cost if the construction cost of the bridge across the San Francisco Bay and the cost and study time for environment preservation are taken into account. In this regard the Altamont Pass route has no advantage to project cost and time.

#### 4. Consideration of the comparative demerit of the Altamont Pass route option

The train operation route of the Altamont Pass option is divided into three at Newark/Fremont station. This will cause a sharp reduction in the number of trains for the Bay Area, leading to a decline of service level. Since the Bay Area has a huge number of HST users, the decline of the service level will directly cause a decrease in transport demand and also reduce the good effects of the Project.

As described in the Draft Program EIR/EIS Report, in the case of the Altamont Pass route option, the number of train stopping at San Jose station will decrease to one third or a half compared to the Pacheco Pass route. The number of trains to Oakland or San Francisco will decrease to two thirds compared to the Pacheco Pass route in the case when the bridge across the San Francisco Bay is constructed. This will heavily hamper the convenience of HST users. The Report says that this will lead to the reduction of demand estimate by 1.1 million passengers per year and operating revenue estimate by 56 million dollars per year (page 2-37). This comment is convincing.

Regarding this problem, improvement can be made to a considerable extent by adopting the EMU system like the Shinkansen. Specifically, from the experience in Japan, it is considered highly feasible to ensure the necessary number of trains by implementing the split and combine of trainsets at Newark/Fremont station (or one station before). The time length required for the train split and combine work is only 2 to 3 minutes. However, for ensuring high-speed transport service, it is undesirable to stop super-express trains at intermediate local station, such as Newark/Fremont, to implement the split and combine work. It is necessary to take into account as much as possible the impact of train schedule disruption in such cases as the large delay of either of the two trains to be combined. In this connection the split and combine work is not recommendable on the Altamont Pass route.

Another comparative demerit of the Altamont route option is the bridge construction across the San Francisco Bay. The construction will cause an increase in the construction cost and occurrence of new environmental problems. The Report states that a new Bay crossing would impact sensitive wetlands, saltwater marshes and aquatic habitat, and would require costly mitigation measures. It concludes that the potential project delays and increased costs were considerable factors.

The travel time between Los Angeles and San Francisco is comparable to that of the Pacheco Pass route only when the bridge is constructed. If this is the case, the selection of the Altamont Pass route itself is not a good selection.

#### 5. Comments on the Pacheco Pass route

In the case of Pacheco Pass route the alignment also splits into two ways at San Jose station. One way is to San Francisco and the other is to Oakland. According to the original operation plan the number of trains decreases 50% for Passengers to San Francisco or Oakland. Therefore JARTS would like to recommend the split and combine work at San Jose station for trains to and from Oakland and San Francisco stations. The adoption of the EMU system like the Shinkansen will enable implementation of the split and combine operation, and a drastic increase in ridership can be expected through the doubling of service frequency and the enhancement of convenience for passengers. The number of cars to be split and combined would be decided depending on the ridership of each direction.

#### 6. Conclusion

*Japan Railway Technical Service*

2

*Quick Review on Altamont Pass route option*

It is considered that there is no better way than to eliminate the Altamont Pass route option in the future study for the promotion of the CHSR Project. It is reasonable to put high priority on stopping of many trains for San Jose, because this measure will also lead to ensuring the increase in the number of trains for San Francisco and Oakland.

As for the San Francisco Bay Area-Sacramento section, speedup on the conventional railway between Oakland and Sacramento was recommended in the past, and the Capitol Rail Corridor was excluded from the objects of the Program EIR/EIS study of this time. This route is contemplated as a route to be taken up in the future in the extension concept of the CHSR Project. (page 2-34)

There is a possibility that some comparative study between the Altamont Pass route and the capitol corridor may be conducted in the future stage. However, JARTS considers it reasonable to eliminate the Altamont Pass route option from the objects of the future study, because the Central Valley is an object area of the project of this time and the support for the Pacheco Pass route option was already decided by voting of the San Francisco Metropolitan Transportation Commission in May 2003. (page 2-38)

We hope that the Shinkansen technologies will continuously be found helpful to the CHSR Project in the future.

*Japan Railway Technical Service*

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**Response to Comments of Ted Buehler, Yolo Rail Advocates, September 7, 2004 (Letter 0084)**

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**0084-1**

Please see standard response 6.3.1.

**0084-2**

Please see the Authority's Business Plan for HST fare assumptions, ridership and revenue forecasts, and forecasted revenue surplus (reference in Section 2.3.2C of the Final Program EIR/EIS). The Business Plan assumed the "full fare" one-way HST ticket price between San Francisco and Los Angeles to be \$42 (1999). It is expected that the per-passenger operating costs of proposed HST services would be less than similar costs for Amtrak services, because it is expected that (1) the operations and maintenance of an HST system would be competitively bid; (2) the HST service would not be burdened by other non-profitable intercity rail services; (3) there would be more passengers per train, than carried by Amtrak on average (i.e., Capitol Corridor not necessarily average); and (4) the HST system would not share tracks with heavy conventional freight which increase maintenance costs.

**0084-3**

Please see standard response 2.25.1.



**Comment Letter 0085****0085**

P.O. BOX 606, MERCED, CA 95340 \* PHONE/FAX (209) 722-9053  
EMAIL: WEBMASTER@YVRR.COM \* WEB: HTTP://WWW.YVRR.COM

March 22, 2004

High Speed Rail Commission  
PO Box 942874  
Sacramento, Ca 94274-0001

Dear Commission Members,

The Yosemite Valley Railroad Company was incorporated as a non-profit California corporation in 1990. The Yosemite Valley Railroad Company was created with the goal of being the catalyst in rebuilding the railroad that served the Merced River corridor between the City of Merced and Yosemite National Park at El Portal between 1907 and 1945. The Railroad provided an easy and inexpensive way to get to the Park during the period it operated. If rebuilt, not only can it again provide alternative transportation to the Park, but at the same time provide a service to the new UC Merced Campus.

There are approximately 4 million people that go to Yosemite National Park per year. It is also estimated that over 30 thousand additional people will be moving to Merced in the next few years due to the new UC Merced Campus. We are going to submit plans to build the first phase of a line from Castle Airport, Aviation and Development Center to the new UC Merced campus. This project would be a direct link to High-Speed Rail at the Merced/Castle Airport, Aviation and Development Center site-

I encourage the High Speed Rail Committee to be in support of Merced/Castle Airport, Aviation and Development Center as their selected maintenance facility and hub site. Although a future rail to Yosemite does not hinge on High-Speed Rail, it would be a major contributing factor to its success. The High-Speed Rail line would be a major link in creating increased rider ship on Amtrak and certainly a major factor in Castle achieving international airport status, as some envision.

- Both SF & UP rail lines come together at the closest point in Merced.
- The two major highways are close to Castle Airport, Aviation and Development Center.
- The facilities for an International Airport (Castle) would be a major player in a High-Speed Rail project.
- The required infrastructure is already in place with the necessary land that is required for a High-Speed Rail hub.
- Amtrak has a spur going onto the Castle base for future High-Speed Rail passengers.

In summary a high-speed rail with its hub at Merced/Castle Airport, Aviation and Development Center would increase Amtrak rider ship 20 fold, as it will help rider ship on the High-Speed Rail in the first phase. Combined with Interstate 5 and congested Highway 99, the marketing possibilities of a rail hook-up from Castle/Merced are truly remarkable. There is no doubt this is the best location for the initial phase of High-Speed Rail with all facts considered. Thanks for your consideration on this matter.

Ted Hogan, President, Yosemite Valley Railroad Co.  
P.O. Box 606, Merced, CA 95340, <http://www.yvrr.com/>  
America's most important rail project- Get involved!!

0085-1

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**Response to Comments of Ted Hogan, President, Yosemite Valley Railroad Co., No Date Received (Letter O085)**

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**O085-01**

Please see standard response 6.19.1 and standard response 2.35.1.

## Comment Letter O086



SIÈGE SOCIAL

**Land and Marine gas turbines**  
Marketing Department  
12<sup>th</sup> February 2004  
Ref. : BW/FLP 04-5122-

Subject : High Speed Trains

Dear Sir,

We are following the efforts of Californian State to introduce convenient High Speed Trains allowing a real alternative for passengers transports. We hope that you will succeed and be leader in mass transportation system

My company Turbomeca is involved since 70's in high speed and has powered the French TGV prototype between 1972 to 1976 at speed above 300km/h.

At the same time, we have powered Turbo trains operating in France, USA (Amtrak North East Corridor), Egypt and Iran. With maximum speed reaching 270km/h, these trains have demonstrated during 12 000 000 hours and more than 600 000 000 km their reliability and availability.

In the 80's, we have proposed to Californian Department of Transports through our agent in US (Allied International Corp. in NY) turbo trains solution similar at those operating between New York / Albany. These trains which have been installed in 1973 are always in operation and have been retrofitted and repowered. If you are interested, we can arrange for you a deep visit of these trains and explain on site what we are optimizing in our new generation of turbo trains. Nevertheless, these trains can operate at 200km/h and have the capability to reach 220 km/h.

From this time, we have developed new generation of gas turbines of which fuel consumption are at the same level than diesel and emissions ten times lower. With trains manufacturer, we have designed new generation of Turbo trains of which characteristics are :

- Lightness below 17 T/axle allowing high speed on existing network and very high speed with track ballast reinforcement
- High comfort and low emission of pollutants and noise
- Flexibility of operation with possibility of dual mode
- Modularity allowing to modify these trains for high frequency connection or high density passengers

**TURBOMECA**  
SA au capital de 38 553 056 euros - 338 481 955 RCS Pau

**NOUVEAU CAPITAL SOCIAL**  
NOUVEAU CAPITAL SOCIAL

Tél. 560 928  
Tél. +33 (0)5 59 12 50 00  
Fax +33 (0)5 59 93 15 12

O086



Letter BW/FLP 04-5122- 12th February  
Page 2/2

We shall be very happy to inform you on these last developments of high speed trains with our gas turbines. These trains cumulates experience of million operating hours occurring high reliability for their operation and low maintenance time and cost during operation.

Please advise me on your availability to organize this open discussions. Waiting to meet you please receive my best regards.

Bernard WITTIER  
Marketing Director

P.J. : Documentation on Turbomeca and its railways activities

O086-1  
cont

O086-1

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**Response to Comments of Bernard Watier, Marketing Director, Turbomeca, No Date Received (Letter 0086)**

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**0086-01**

Please see standard response 2.9.2.